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ARGUMENT 
The Workers Compensation Fund of Utah and the Utah Self-Insurers' Association, as 
amici curiae, jointly file the following Reply Brief pursuant to Rule 50(e) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure and pursuant to the parties' previously filed briefing stipulation. 
1. MR. CROSLAND'S OPPOSITION BRIEF FAILS TO ADDRESS THE 
SERIOUS STANDARD OF REVIEW CONFLICT BETWEEN CROSLAND AND MORTON. 
The amicus curiae briefs filed in support of Young Electric Sign Company's petition for a 
writ of certiorari demonstrate that the Utah Court of Appeals' opinion in Crosland fails to apply 
the standard of review set forth in Morton v. Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). In 
response to this criticism, Mr. Crosland quotes an extended excerpt from page 36 of the 
Crosland opinion and then concludes that the Court of Appeals "thus properly cited and 
followed the standard of review announced by this Court in Morton." (See Mr. Crosland's 
opposition brief at p. 9.) 
Mr. Crosland's tautological Morton analysis is as illusory as is the Court of Appeals' 
analysis. Indeed, because Mr. Crosland advances no argument to demonstrate how the 
Crosland court properly applied the Morton standard. The detailed analyses contained on 
pages 6 through 11 of the Utah Self-Insurers' Association's amicus brief and on pages 6 
through 9 of the Workers Compensation Fund's amicus brief are not remotely addressed by 
Mr. Crosland's extended quotation from the Crosland opinion. Amici's contention that 
Crosland directly conflicts with Morton stands unrebutted. 
Mr. Crosland attempts to skirt the Morton issue by asserting that "it is clear that the 
Industrial Commission in Crosland never attempted, in the first instance, to interpret [the term 
"permanent impairment]." (Mr. Crosland's opposition brief, p. 9.) This assertion is not 
correct. Mr. Crosland's counsel is well aware that the Industrial Commission could never have 
apportioned Mr. Crosland's disability award without first finding that Mr. Crosland's 
asymptomatic preexisting condition constituted a non-compensable permanent impairment 
under Utah Code Ann. §35-1-66 (1988). Both the medical panel and the Industrial 
Commission unequivocally concluded that Mr. Crosland's asymptomatic preexisting 
spondylosis condition constituted a preexisting "permanent impairment" within the meaning of 
§35-1-66. To argue that this finding is not contained in the Industrial Commission's Order is 
like arguing that the Industrial Commission is not aware that 2 + 2 = 4.1 
The fact that the Industrial Commission readily equated Mr. Crosland's preexisting 
condition with a non-compensable permanent impairment demonstrates the long-standing and 
(heretofore) automatic Industrial Commission practice of apportioning between preexisting 
asymptomatic nonwork-related conditions and industrially-caused conditions. The principle is 
simply too well recognized to even require comment by the Commission that an asymptomatic 
preexisting condition cannot be compensated under §35-1-66. Accordingly, the fact that the 
Utah Court of Appeals failed to engage in a proper and thorough Morton standard of review 
analysis in this case is grounds for reviewing and reversing the Crosland opinion. 
2. MR. CROSLAND MISCONSTRUES AMICI'S ARGUMENT 
AS TO HOW CROSLAND CONFLICTS WITH HOLLOWAY. 
On pages 10 and 11 of his opposition brief, Mr. Crosland addresses the conflict existing 
between the Hollowav and Crosland opinions by launching into an Allen higher standard of 
legal causation argument. This higher standard argument has nothing to do with the conflict 
analysis contained on pages 11 through 13 of the Utah Self-Insurers' Association's amicus 
brief. The conflict between Hollowav and Crosland lies in the two opinions' radically different 
treatment of the importance of asymptomatic preexisting conditions. On the one hand, 
Justices Zimmerman and Howe (in Hollowav) advance the public policy of encouraging Utah 
employers to hire individuals with preexisting disabilities; those Justices announce that 
employees must not be able to "foist the cost of [the preexisting components of] injuries] on 
[their] employees] when the work place had little to do with causing the injuries]." See, 
Hollowav v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 3 1 , 32 (Utah 1986). On the other hand, the 
Utah Court of Appeals' opinion in Crosland expressly defeats the public policy advanced by 
Furthermore, i t should be observed that the Industr ia l Commission did 
express ly equate Mr. Crosland's pre -ex i s t ing condition with a §35-1-66 "permanent 
impairment." Administrative Law Judge Barbara E l i c e r i o , in her August 14, 1990 
Order entered below, s p e c i f i c a l l y decided "there i s no j u s t i f i c a t i o n for finding 
that the f u l l r20%1 impairment [assigned to Mr. Crosland] i s the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
of the carr i er ." (See page 5 of the Order attached as Exhibit "4" to the i n i t i a l 
br ief f i l e d by the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah.) Accordingly, the 
Industr ia l Commission, by and through Judge E l i c e r i o , did s p e c i f i c a l l y find that 
one-half or 10% of Mr. Crosland's permanent impairment was non-compensable under 
§35-1-66. 
Hollowav, because the Court of Appeals expressly held that the Industrial Commission cannot 
apportion between an asymptomatic preexisting component and an industrially-caused 
component of a given employee's injury. Because of this clear conflict, the Crosland opinion 
should be reviewed and reversed on certiorari. 
3. CROSLAND FAILS TO RECOGNIZE THAT SINCE THE ORTEGA LINE OF CASES, 
UTAH HAS PROTECTED EMPLOYERS FROM THE RESPONSIBILITY OF PAYING 
BENEFITS FOR PRE-EXISTING IMPAIRMENTS BASED ON THE SOUND PUBLIC POLICY 
OF ENCOURAGING THE HIRING AND RETENTION OF PREVIOUSLY IMPAIRED WORKERS. 
PROFESSOR ARTHUR LARSON DOES NOT SUPPORT A CONTRARY POSITION. 
Crosland and the Court of Appeals erroneously rely upon Professor Arthur Larson's 
treatise Workers Compensation Law for the proposition that no apportionment should be made 
between preexisting undiagnosed, asymptomatic injuries and work related injuries in 
determining the extent of the employer's responsibility for the payment of weekly permanent 
partial disability compensation.2 Crosland chose not to include key language of the Larson 
quote: 
Apart from special statute, apportionable "disability" does not 
include a prior nondisabling defect or disease that contributes to 
the end result. Nothing is better established...3 
Utah does have a special statute. In pertinent part that statute reads: 
...Permanent partial disability compensation may not be paid for 
any permanent impairment that existed prior to an industrial 
accident...* 
Under this statutory scheme, Utah has chosen legislatively and judicially to apportion 
permanent partial disability (impairment) compensation.5 
Professor Larson does not consider a statute such as that found in Utah in connection 
with the language quoted by Crosland. Larson does not discuss "permanent impairment" at all 
See pages 12 and 13 of Crosland1s Brief in opposition to Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari. 
3
. 2 Larson, Workers Compensation Law, Section 59.22(a) (1989) 
(Emphasis added. Italics indicate the portion of quote not included in 
Crosland*s brief.) 
4
. §35-1-66 U.C.A., 1988. (Emphasis added) 
5
. See argument at pages 10 through 16 in WCF's Amicus Curiae Brief in 
Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
and especially not as that term is used in Utah.6 In the Larson treatise, "disability" awards are 
wage loss compensation benefits for the period of time in which the physical injury has not 
stabilized medically and the injured worker is unable to return to work. That is in contrast to 
"permanent partial disability" awards which are based solely on the loss of bodily function 
regardless of ability to work.7 
In 1988 the Legislature had before it a long line of cases in which employers had been 
relieved of the responsibility of paying permanent partial disability benefits for preexisting 
"impairments" whether they were manifest or quiescent.8 An extremely strong thread of 
public policy ties all of those cases together-employers should be encouraged to hire and 
retain employees suffering from "...permanent impairmentls] that existed prior to an industrial 
accident." The 1988 Legislature chose to continue this public policy by limiting the employer's 
liability to only those impairments which are actually caused by the work environment.9 
I t i s important to look at the context in which Professor Larson makes 
the statement quoted by Crosland and the Court of Appeals concerning 
"apportionable d i s a b i l i t y " . Professor Larson discusses "d i sab i l i ty" early in his 
t r e a t i s e section en t i t l ed Wage Loss Vs. Medical Incapacity. He dist inguishes 
"d i sab i l i ty" from what one might ca l l the medical determination of the loss of 
physical function. "Disabil i ty" i s the concept upon which temporary weekly 
compensation to replace los t wages i s based. See §35-1-65 U.C.A. In contrast , 
loss of physical function i s the basis for awards of permanent p a r t i a l d i s ab i l i t y 
compensation in §35-1-66 U.C.A. Larson wri tes : 
§57.00 Compensable disability i s i nab i l i t y , as the 
r e su l t of a work-connected injury, to perform or obtain 
work sui table to the claimant 's qual i f ica t ions and 
t r a i n i n g . . . 
**** 
§57.13 Permanent disability 
Permanent partial awards may be scheduled or 
unscheduled. Permanent partial scheduled awards are 
based on medical condition after maximum improvement has 
been reached, and ignore wage loss entirely. Fixed 
payments for loss of specified members are due even if 
the claimant during the period is back at work at higher 
wages than before... 
Workers Compensation Law, supra, at 10-1 and 10-62. (Emphasis added.) 
7
. §35-1-66 U.C.A., 1988. 
*• See citations to Ortega and its offspring at pages 11 and 12 of the 
Workers Compensation Fund amicus brief. 
9
. Utah employers are still responsible for all periods of temporary 
total and temporary partial disability compensation. This liability is the 
employer's even though the compensation period is enlarged by reason of a pre-
existing condition. See U.C.A. §§35-1-65 & 35-1-65.1. 
It is inaccurate for Crosland to argue Utah has not routinely apportioned the kind of 
preexisting impairments experienced by him. Prior to 1988, such impairments were 
apportioned and became the liability of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund pursuant to §§35-1-
68 and 35-1-69 U.C.A., and were not a liability of employers. The special language of U.C.A. 
§35-1-66 as enacted in 1988 codifies that case law and historic practice reaffirming the 
employer's limited liability. The injured employee now receives no compensation for 
"impairments" which predate and are not caused by the industrial accident. There is 
absolutely no evidence that the 1988 Legislature intended to pass a law contrary to Utah's 
longstanding hiring and retention public policy by placing the burden on employers to pay 
compensation benefits for impairments not causally connected to job related injuries and 
illnesses. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court should grant certiorari for the reasons stated herein and the briefs 
previously submitted by Amici Curiae and Young Electric Sign Company. 
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